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Abstract
I review the problem of the choice of the priors from the point of
view of a physicist interested in measuring a physical quantity, and I try
to show that the reference priors often recommended for the purpose
(Jeffreys priors) do not fit to the problem. Although it may seem sur-
prising, it is easier for an “experienced physicist” to accept subjective
priors, or even purely subjective elicitation of probabilities, without
explicit use of the Bayes’ theorem. The problem of the use of reference
priors is set in the more general context of “Bayesian dogmatism”,
which could really harm Bayesianism.
1 Introduction
The choice of the prior is usually felt to be a vital problem by all those
who approach the Bayesian methods with a purely utilitarian spirit, with-
out having assimilated the philosophy of subjective probability. Some use
“Bayesian formulae” simply because they “have proved”, by Monte Carlo
simulation, that they work in a particular problem. Others like the principles
of Bayesian reasoning, but are embarrassed by the apparent “arbitrariness”
of the priors. Just to mention an example of this second attitude, I have
been told of a conference[1] in which astrophysicists discussing which sta-
tistical methods to use concluded, more or less: “yes, Bayesian statistics
looks nice, but now we should make an effort to define our priors in an ob-
jective way”. The use of the reference priors (hereafter I will refer only to
Jeffreys’ priors[2], the most common in Physics applications) gives a chance
to avoid taking responsibility when assessing which priors are suitable for
a specific problem, and it gives the illusion of objectivity (the dream of the
simple minded practitioner). Although I agree on the validity of a “concept
of a ‘minimal informative’ prior specification - appropriately defined!”[3], to
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those who are not fully aware of the intentions and limits of reference anal-
ysis, the Bayesian approach can be perceived as dogmatic. In this paper I
would like to comment on Jeffreys’ priors from the side of the “experienced
physicist”1, a point of view often neglected, since this matter is more often
debated among mathematicians, statisticians or philosophers. So, instead
of focusing on the original intentions of Jeffreys’ priors, I will criticize their
uncritical use, the shadow of dogmatism they diffuse on the theory, and the
unstated psychological motivations of some of their supporters. In contrast,
I will stress the guiding role of the guess of the “expert”, which allows the
subjective assessment of uncertainty even in the case of a single observa-
tion. To make this point understandable to those who are not familiar with
experimentation, I will give a brief reminder, later, of how measurements
are actually performed and I will comment on the ISO (International Or-
ganization for Standardization) recommendations concerning measurement
uncertainty.
2 Bayesian dogmatism and its dangers
In principle there is little to comment on the indiscriminate use and un-
critical recommendation of reference priors. It is enough to glance at many
books, lecture notes, articles and conference proceedings on Bayesian theory
and applications. I would just like to give an example which concerns me
very much, because it may influence the High Energy Physics community to
which I belong. In a paper which recently appeared in Physical Review[4] it
is stated that
“For a parameter µ which is restricted to [0,∞], a common non-
informative prior in the statistical literature is P (µt) = 1/µt. . . In
contrast the PDG2description is equivalent to using a prior which is
uniform in µt. This prior has no basis that we know of in Bayesian
theory”
This example should be taken really very seriously. The authors in fact use
the pulpit of a prestigious journal3 to appear as if they understand well both
1With this generic name I mean whoever is used to an everyday confrontation with
real data.
2PDG stands for “Particle Data Group”, a committee that publishes every second year
the Review of Particle Properties[5], a very influential collection of data, formulae and
methods, including sections on Probability and Statistics.
3This is also an example of bad style, publishing a paper in a Physics journal, pretending
that it is a contribution to statistical theory, but avoiding undergoing the scrutiny of
a more appropriate referee (“In this paper, we use the freedom inherent in Neyman’s
construction in a novel way to obtain a unified set of classical confidence intervals for
setting limits and quoting two-sided confidence intervals. The new element is a particular
choice of ordering, based on likelihood ratios, which we substitute for more common choices
in Neyman’ construction”[4].) .
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the Bayesian and the classical approach and, on this basis, they discourage
the use of Bayesian methods (“We then obtain confidence intervals which
are never unphysical or empty. Thus they remove an original intention for
the description of Bayesian intervals by the PDG”).
So, while someone can be in favour of default use of reference priors,
which may have some advantage in attracting practitioners reluctant to
subjectivism, it seems to me that in the long term it can play against the
Bayesian theory, in a similar way to that which happened at the end of
last century, because of the abuse of uniform distribution. This worry is
well expressed in John Earman’s conclusions to his “critical examination of
Bayesian confirmation theory”[6]:
“We than seem to be faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, Bayesian
considerations seem indispensable in formulating and evaluating scien-
tific inference. But on the other hand, the use of the full Bayesian
apparatus seems to commit the user to a form of dogmatism”.
3 Unstated psychological motivations behind Jef-
freys’ priors?
From the most general (and abstract) point of view, it is not difficult to
agree that “in one-dimensional continuous regular problems, Jeffreys’ prior
is appropriate”[3]. Unfortunately, it is rarely the case that in physical situ-
ations the status of prior knowledge is equivalent to that expressed by the
Jeffreys’ priors, as I will discuss later. Reading “between the lines”, it seems
to me that the reason for choosing them is essentially psychological. For
instance, when used to infer µ (typically associated with the “true value”)
from “Gaussian small samples”, the use of a prior of the kind f◦(µ, σ) ∝ 1/σ
has two formal benefits:
• first, the mathematical solution is simple (this reminds me of the story
of the drunk under the streetlamp, looking for the key lost in the dark
alley);
• second, one recovers the Student distribution, and for some it seems to
be reassuring that a Bayesian result gets blessed by “well established”
frequentistic methods. (“We know that this is the right solution”, a
convinced Bayesian once told me. . . )
But these arguments, never explicitly stated, cannot be accepted, for obvious
reasons. I would like only to comment on the Student distribution, the
“standard way” for handling small samples, although there is in fact no deep
reason for aiming to get such a distribution for the posterior. This becomes
clear to anyone who, having measured the size of this page twice and having
found a difference of 0.3 mm between the measurements, then has to base
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his conclusion on that distribution. Any rational person will refuse to state
that, in order to be 99.9% confident in the result, the uncertainty interval
should be 9.5 cm wide (any carpenter would laugh. . . ). This may be the
reason why, as far as I know, physicists don’t use the Student distribution.
Another typical application of the Jeffrey’ prior is in the case of infer-
ence on the λ parameter of a Poisson distribution, having observed a certain
number of events. Many have, in fact, a reluctance to accept as an estimate
of λ a value which differs from the observed number of counts (for example,
E(λ) = x+ 1 starting from a uniform prior) and which is deemed to be dis-
torted by the “distorted” frequentistic criteria to analyse the problem. In
my opinion, in this case one should simply educate the practitioners about
the difference between the concept of maximum belief and that of prevision
(or expected value). An example in which the difference becomes crucial
is the case where no counts are observed, a typical situation for frontier
physics, where new phenomena are constantly looked for. Any reasonable
prior consistent with an investigated rare process, close to the limit of ex-
perimental sensitivity, provides reasonable results (even a uniform prior is
good for the purpose) and allows the calculation of “upper limits”. Instead,
a prior of the kind f◦(λ) ∝ 1/λ prevents the use of any quantitative prob-
abilistic statement to summarize the achievement of the measurement and
the same result (0 ± 0) will come out independently of the size, sensitivity
and running time of the experiment.
In the following I will only consider the case of normally distributed
observations.
4 Unavoidable prior knowledge behind any mea-
surement
To understand why an “experienced physicist” has difficulty in accepting a
prior of the kind f◦(σ) ∝ 1/σ (or f◦(ln(σ)) = k), one has to remember that
the process of measurement is very complex (even in everyday situations, like
measuring the size of the page You are reading now, just to avoid abstract
problems):
• first You have to define the measurand (the quantity we are interested
in);
• then You have to choose the appropriate instrument, having known
properties, well suited range and resolution, and in which You have
some confidence, achieved on the basis of previous measurements;
• the measurement is performed and, if possible, repeated several times;
• then, if needed, You apply corrections, also based on previous expe-
rience with that kind of measurement, in order to take into account
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known (within uncertainty) systematic effects;
• finally4 You get a credibility interval for the quantity (usually a best
estimate with a related uncertainty);
Each step involves some prior knowledge and, typically, each person who
performs the measurement (either a physicist, a biologist, a carpenter or a
bricklayer) operates in his field of expertise. This means that he is well aware
of the error he might make, and then of the uncertainty associated with the
result. This is also true if only a single observation has been performed5:
try to ask a carpenter how much he believes in his result, possibly helping
him to quantify the uncertainty using the concept of the coherent bet.
There is also another important aspect of the “single measurement”.
One should note that many measurements, which seem to be due to a single
observation, consist in fact of several observations made within a short time:
for example, measuring a length with a design ruler, one checks several times
the alignment of the zero mark with the beginning of the segment to be
measured; or, measuring a voltage with a voltmeter or a mass with a balance,
one waits until the reading is well stabilized. Experts use unconsciously
information of this kind when they have to state an uncertainty.
The fact that the evaluation of uncertainty does not come necessarily
from repeated measurements has also been recognized by the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) in its “Guide to the expression of
uncertainty in measurement”[8]. There the uncertainty is classified “into
two categories according to the way their numerical value is estimated:
A. those which are evaluated by statistical methods6;
B. those which are evaluated by other means;”[8]
Then, illustrating the ways to evaluate the “type B standard uncer-
tainty”, the Guide states that
“the associated estimated variance u2(xi) or the standard uncertainty
u(xi) is evaluated by scientific judgement based on all of the available
information on the possible variability of Xi. The pool of information
may include
- previous measurement data;
- experience with or general knowledge of the behaviour and prop-
erties of relevant materials and instruments;
4This is not really the end of the story if You wish Your result to have some impact
on the scientific community (or simply on commerce). Only if other people trust You,
will they use the result in further scientific (or business) reasoning, as if it were their own
result.
5This defence of the possibility of quoting an uncertainty from a single measurement
has nothing to do with the mathematical games like those of [7].
6Here “statistical” stands for “repeated observations on the same measurand.”
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- manufacturer’s specifications;
- data provided in calibration and other certificates;
- uncertainties assigned to reference data taken from handbooks.”
It is easy to see that the above statements have sense only if the probability
is interpreted as degree of belief, as explicitly recognized by the Guide:
“. . .Type B standard uncertainty is obtained from an assumed proba-
bility density function based on the degree of belief that an event will
occur [often called subjective probability. . . ].”
It is also interesting to read the worries of theGuide concerning the uncritical
use of statistical methods and of abstract formulae:
“the evaluation of uncertainty is neither a routine task nor a purely
mathematical one; it depends on detailed knowledge of the nature of
the measurand and of the measurement. The quality and utility of the
uncertainty quoted for the result of a measurement therefore ultimately
depend on the understanding, critical analysis, and integrity of those
who contribute to the assignment of its value”[8].
This appears to me perfectly in line with the lesson of genuine subjectivism,
accompanied by the normative rule of coherence[9]. It is instead surprising
to see how many Bayesians seek refuge in stereotyped formulae or to see
how many still stick to the frequentistic idea that repeated observations are
needed in order to evaluate the uncertainty of a measurement.
5 Rough modelling of realistic priors
After these comments on measurement, it becomes clearer why a prior of
the kind f◦(µ, σ) ∝ 1/σ does not look natural. As far as σ is concerned,
this prior would imply that standard deviations ranging over several orders
of magnitude would be equally possible. This is unreasonable in most cases.
For example, measuring the size of this page, no one would expect σ ≈
O(1 cm) or ≈ O(1µm). Coming to µ, the choice f◦(µ) = k is acceptable
until σ ≪ µ (the so called Savage principle of precise measurement[10]). But
when the order of magnitude of σ is uncertain, the prior on µ should also be
revised (for example, most of the directly measured quantities are positively
defined).
Some priors which, in my experience, are closer to the typical prior
knowledge of the person who makes routine measurements are those con-
cerning the order of magnitude of σ, or the order of magnitude on the
precision (quantified by the variation coefficient v = σ/|µ|). For example7,
7For sake of simplicity, let us stick to the case in which the fluctuations are larger that
the intrinsic instrumental resolution. Otherwise one needs to model the prior (and the
likelihood) with a discrete distribution.
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one may expect a r.m.s. error of 1 mm, but values of 0.5 or 2.0 mm would
not look surprising. Even 0.1 or 2 mm would look possible, but certainly
not 10µm or 2 cm. Alternatively, for other measurements, what matters
could be the order of magnitude of the class of precision. In both cases a
distribution which seems suitable for a rough modelling of this kind of priors
is a lognormal in either σ or v. For instance, the above example could be
modeled with lnσ normally distributed with average 0 (= ln 1) and standard
deviation 0.4. The 1, 2 and 3 standard deviation interval on σ/mm would be
[0.7, 1.5], [0.5, 2.2] and [0.3, 3.3], respectively, in qualitative agreement with
the prior knowledge.
In the case of more sophisticated measurements in which the measurand
is a positive defined quantity of unknown order of magnitude a suitable
prior of µ is flat in lnµ (before the first measurement you don’t know the
order of magnitude you will get), while of σ is somehow correlated to µ (v is
expected, reasonably, to lie in a range, the extremes of which do not differ
by too many orders of magnitudes).
One may think of other possible measurements which give rise to other
priors, but I find it very difficult to imagine a real situation for which the
Jeffrey’s priors are appropriate.
6 Purely subjective assessments
In the previous section I have given some suggestions for solving the problem
within the framework of the Bayes’ theorem paradigm. But I don’t want to
give the impression that this is the only way to proceed.
The most important teaching of subjective probability is that probability
is always conditioned by a given status of information. The probability is
updated in the light of any new information. But it is not always possible
to describe the updating mechanism using the neat scheme of the Bayes’
theorem. This is well known in many fields, and, in principle, there is no
reason for considering the use of the Bayes theorem to be indispensable
to assessing uncertainty in scientific measurements. The idea is to force
the expert to declare (using the coherent bet) some quantiles in which he
believes is contained the true value, on the basis of a few observations. It
may be easier for him to estimate the uncertainty in this way, drawing on
his past experience, rather than trying to model some priors and to play
with the Bayes’ theorem. The message is what experimentalists intuitively
do: when you have just a few observations, what you already know is more
important than what the standard deviation of the data teaches you.
Some will probably be worried by the arbitrariness of this conclusion, but
it has to be remembered that: an expert can make very good guesses in his
field; 20, 30, or even 50 % uncertainty in the uncertainty is not considered
to significantly spoil the quality of a measurement; there are usually many
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other sources of uncertainty, due to possible systematic effects on unknown
size, which can easily be more critical. I am much more worried by the
attitude of giving up prior knowledge to a mathematical convenience, since
this can sometimes lead to paradoxical results.
7 Conclusions
The default use of Jeffreys priors is clearly unjustified, especially in inferring
the parameters of the normal distribution, the model mainly used in physics
measurements. A more realistic choice of the priors would be lognormal
in σ or in the variation coefficient, but the posteriors do not have a closed
form and nobody wants to make complicated calculations in routine mea-
surements. When the number of measurements is of the order of the unit it
can be more reasonable to use just subjective estimates in the light of the
observed data and of past experience. This corresponds to the practice of
“experienced physicists”, who tend to trust more in prior experience when
they are not able to perform many measurements. In particular, it is abso-
lutely legitimate to state the uncertainty, even if only a single measurement
has been made, when one has the appropriate prior knowledge. This has
also been recognized by the metrological authorities.
As a more general remark, I find all attempts to put the Bayesian theory
on dogmatic grounds very dangerous. Not only because this can sometimes
lead to absurd results in critical situations, but also because such results can
seriously damage the credibility of the Bayesian theory itself.
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